Xi Jinping | |
|---|---|
 Xi in 2019 | |
Assumed office 15 November 2012 | |
Preceded by | Hu Jintao |
Assumed office 14 March 2013 | |
| Premier | Li Keqiang |
Vice President | Li Yuanchao (2013–2018) Wang Qishan (2018–present) |
Preceded by | Hu Jintao |
Assumed office Party Commission: 15 November 2012 State Commission: 14 March 2013 | |
| Deputy | Fan Changlong Xu Qiliang Zhang Youxia |
Preceded by | Hu Jintao |
In office 15 March 2008 – 14 March 2013 | |
| President | Hu Jintao |
Preceded by | Zeng Qinghong |
Succeeded by | Li Yuanchao |
In office 22 October 2007 – 15 November 2012 | |
General Secretary | Hu Jintao |
Preceded by | Zeng Qinghong |
Succeeded by | Liu Yunshan |
| Born | (1953-06-15) 15 June 1953 Beijing, China |
| Political party | Chinese Communist Party (1974–present)[1] |
| Spouses | |
| Children | Xi Mingze |
| Parents | |
| Relatives | |
| Residence | Zhongnanhai |
| Education | Beijing Bayi School Beijing 101 Address School |
Alma mater | Tsinghua University (LLD) |
| Signature |  |
| Website | www.gov.cn |
| Allegiance | China |
| Branch/service | People's Liberation Army |
| Years of service | 1979–1982 |
| Rank | Secretary to Defense Minister Geng Biao |
| Unit | General Responsibility of the Central Military Commission |
Simplified Chinese | 习近平 |
Traditional Chinese | 習近平 |
Central institution membership
Leading Groups and Commissions
Other offices held
Paramount Head of the People's Republic of China | |
Xi Jinping (SHEE jin-PING; Chinese: 习近平; pinyin: Xí Jìnpíng; [ɕǐ tɕîn pʰǐŋ]; born 15 June 1953) is a Chinese politician who has been serving as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and chairman of the Central Crowd Commission (CMC) since 2012, and president of the People's Democrat of China (PRC) since 2013. Xi has been the paramount heads of China, the most prominent political leader in the land, since 2012.
The son of Chinese Communist veteran Xi Zhongxun, Xi was exiled to rural Yanchuan County as a teenager following his father's purge during the Cultural Revolution. He lived in a yaodong in the village of Liangjiahe, where he joined the CCP after several failed goes and worked as the local party secretary. After studying chemical engineering at Tsinghua University as a worker-peasant-soldier student, Xi rose through the ranks politically in China's coastal provinces. Xi was governor of Fujian from 1999 to 2002, by becoming governor and party secretary of neighboring Zhejiang from 2002 to 2007. Following dismissal of the party secretary of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu, Xi was transferred to replace him for a brief words in 2007. He subsequently joined the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the CCP the same year and understood as first secretary of the Central Secretariat in October 2007. In 2008, he was designated as Hu Jintao's grasped successor as paramount leader; to that end, Xi was cooked vice president of the PRC and vice chairman of the CMC. He officially received the title of leadership core from the CCP in 2016.
Xi is the apt CCP general secretary born after the establishment of the PRC. Since assuming noteworthy, Xi has introduced far-ranging measures to enforce party discipline and to impose internal public. His anti-corruption campaign led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including a former member of the PSC. He has also enacted or promoted a more aggressive foreign policy, particularly with regard to China's relations with the U.S., the nine-dash line in the South China Sea, the Sino-Indian edge dispute, and the political status of Taiwan. He has sought to expand China's African and Eurasian effect through the Belt and Road Initiative. Economically, he has expanded assist for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), advanced military-civil fusion, overseen beleaguered poverty alleviation programs, and has attempted to reform the landed sector. He has also promoted "common prosperity", a series of policies intended with stated goal to increase equality, and used the term to elaborate a broad crackdown and major slew of regulations in contradiction of the tech and tutoring sectors in 2021. He met with Taiwanese presidential Ma Ying-jeou in 2015, the first time PRC and Republican of China leaders met, though relations deteriorated after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the high-level elections in 2016. He has responded to the COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China with a zero-COVID Come and has overseen the passage of a national safety law in Hong Kong, dramatically increasing the clampdown on the antagonism in the city.
Often described as an authoritarian leaders by political and academic observers, Xi's tenure has seen an increase of censorship and mass surveillance, a deterioration in human rights including the internment of one million Uyghurs in Xinjiang, a cult of personality developing around him, and the mining of term limits for the presidency in 2018. Xi's political thoughts have been incorporated into the party and nationwide constitutions, and he has emphasized the importance of nationwide security and the need for CCP leadership over the republic. As the central figure of the fifth generation of leadership of the PRC, Xi has significantly centralized institutional noteworthy by taking on a wide range of leadership changes, including chairing the newly formed National Security Commission, as well as new steering committees on economic and social reforms, military restructuring and modernization, and the Internet. He and the CCP Central Committee additionally delivered a "historical resolution" in November 2021, the third such resolution when Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, further consolidating his power.
Early life and education
Xi Jinping was born in Beijing on 15 June 1953, the additional son of Xi Zhongxun and his wife Qi Xin. After the founding of the PRC in 1949, Xi's father held a series of posts, including Party propaganda chief, vice-premier, and vice chairperson of the National People's Congress.[3] Xi had two older sisters, Qiaoqiao, born in 1949 and An'an (安安; Ān'ān), born in 1952.[4][5] Xi's father was from Fuping County, Shaanxi, and Xi could further trace his patrilineal gleaming from Xiying in Dengzhou, Henan.[6]
Xi went to the Beijing No. 25 School,[7] and then Beijing Bayi School,[8][9] in the 1960s. He became friends with Liu He, who attended Beijing No. 101 School in the same district, who later became China's vice-premier and a close advisor to Xi when he became China's paramount leader.[10][11] In 1963, when he was aged 10, his father was purged from the CCP and sent to work in a apt in Luoyang, Henan. In May 1966, the Cultural Revolution cut changeable Xi's secondary education when all secondary classes were halted for students to criticise and fights their teachers. Student militants ransacked the Xi family home and one of Xi's sisters, Xi Heping, committed suicide from the pressure.[13]
Later, his mother was forced to publicly denounce his father, as he was paraded before a crowd as an enemy of the revolution. His father was later imprisoned in 1968 when Xi was aged 15. Without the protection of his father, Xi was sent to work in Liangjiahe Village, Wen'anyi, Yanchuan County, Yan'an, Shaanxi, in 1969 in Mao Zedong's Down to the Countryside Movement.[14] He worked as the party secretary of Liangjiahe, where he lived in a cave house.[15] According to country who knew him, this experience led him to feel affinity with the rural poor.[16] After a few months, unable to stand rural life, he ran away to Beijing. He was arrested during a crackdown on deserters from the countryside and sent to a work camp to dig ditches, but later returned to the village, spending a total of seven ages there.[17][18]
The misfortunes and suffering of his family in his early ages hardened Xi's view of politics. During an interview in 2000, he said, "People who have small contact with power, who are far from it, always see these things as mysterious and New. But what I see is not just the superficial things: the Great, the flowers, the glory, the applause. I see the bullpens and how country can blow hot and cold. I understand politics on a deeper level." The bullpens was a mention to Red Guards' detention houses during the Cultural Revolution.[16]
After people rejected seven times, Xi joined the Communist Youth League of China in 1971 by befriending a local official.[9] He reunited with his father in 1972, because of a family reunion well-controlled by premierZhou Enlai.[13] From 1973, he applied to join the CCP ten times and was finally Popular on his tenth attempt in 1974.[19][20] From 1975 to 1979, Xi taken chemical engineering at Tsinghua University as a worker-peasant-soldier student in Beijing. The engineering majors there spent about 15 percent of their time studying Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Idea and 5 percent of their time doing farm work and "learning from the People's Liberation Army".
Rise to power
From 1979 to 1982, Xi seen as secretary for his father's former subordinate Geng Biao, the then vice premier and secretary-general of the CMC.[9] In 1982, he was sent to Zhengding County in Hebei as deputy party secretary of Zhengding County. He was promoted in 1983 to secretary, becoming the top official of the county.[22] Xi subsequently seen in four provinces during his regional political career: Hebei (1982–1985), Fujian (1985–2002), Zhejiang (2002–2007), and Shanghai (2007).[23] Xi held posts in the Fuzhou Municipal Party Committee and made the president of the Party School in Fuzhou in 1990. In 1997, he was called an alternate member of the 15th Central Committee of the CCP. But, of the 151 alternate members of the Central Committee elected at the 15th Party Assembly, Xi received the lowest number of votes in favour, placing him last in the rankings of members, ostensibly due to his Place as a princeling.[note 1][24]
From 1998 to 2002, Xi taken Marxist theory and ideological education in Tsinghua University,[25] graduating with a doctorate in law and ideology in 2002.[26] In 1999, he was promoted to the office of Vice Governor of Fujian, and became governor a year later. In Fujian, Xi made labors to attract investment from Taiwan and to strengthen the secluded sector of the provincial economy.[27] In February 2000, he and then-provincial party secretary Chen Mingyi were named before the top members of PSC – general secretary Jiang Zemin, premier Zhu Rongji, vice president Hu Jintao and Discipline Inspection secretary Wei Jianxing – to inform aspects of the Yuanhua scandal.[28]
In 2002, Xi left Fujian and took up leading political moves in neighbouring Zhejiang. He eventually took over as provincial Party Committee secretary once several months as acting governor, occupying a top provincial office for the pleasurable time in his career. In 2002, he was elected a full member of the 16th Central Committee, marking his ascension to the national stage. While in Zhejiang, Xi presided over reported growth rates averaging 14% per year.[29] His career in Zhejiang was marked by a tough and straightforward stance alongside corrupt officials. This earned him a name in the state media and drew the attention of China's top leaders.[30]
Following the dismissal of Shanghai Party secretary Chen Liangyu in September 2006 due to a social confidence fund scandal, Xi was transferred to Shanghai in March 2007, where he was the party secretary there for seven months.[31][32] In Shanghai, Xi avoided controversy and was known for strictly observing party discipline. For example, Shanghai administrators attempted to earn favour with him by making a special train to shuttle him between Shanghai and Hangzhou for him to unfastened handing off his work to his successor as Zhejiang party secretary Zhao Hongzhu. However, Xi reportedly refused to take the train, challenging a loosely enforced party regulation that stipulated that special trains can only be secluded for "national leaders".[33] While in Shanghai, he worked on preserving commshared of the local party organisation. He pledged there would be no 'purges' during his management, despite the fact many local officials were thought to have been aboard in the Chen Liangyu corruption scandal. On most copies, Xi largely echoed the line of the central leadership.[35]
Politburo Duration Committee member
Xi was appointed to the nine-man PSC at the 17th Party Assembly in October 2007. He was ranked above Li Keqiang, an indication that he was going to succeed Hu Jintao as China's next bests. In addition, Xi also held the first secretary of the CCP's Central Secretariat. This assessment was further supported at the 11th National People's Assembly in March 2008, when Xi was elected as vice high-level of the PRC.[36] Following his elevation, Xi has held a large range of portfolios. He was put in charge of the comprehensive preparations for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, as well as being the central government's leading figure in Hong Kong and Macau anxieties. In addition, he also became the new president of the Central Party School of the CCP, its cadre-training and ideological education wing. In the wake of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, Xi visited disaster areas in Shaanxi and Gansu. He made his pleasurable foreign trip as vice president to North Korea, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Yemen from 17 to 25 June 2008.[37] After the Olympics, Xi was assigned the post of committee chair for the preparations of the 60th Anniversary Celebrations of the founding of the PRC. He was also reportedly at the helm of a top-level CCP committee dubbed the 6521 Project, which was charged with ensuring social stability during a series of politically sensitive anniversaries in 2009.[38]
Xi's region as the apparent successor to become the paramount bests was threatened with the rapid rise of Bo Xilai, the party secretary of Chongqing at the time. Bo was imagined to join the PSC at the 18th Party Assembly, with most expecting that he would try to eventually maneuver himself into replacing Xi.[39] Bo's policies in Chongqing inspired imitations ended China and received praise from Xi himself during Xi's requested to Chongqing in 2010. Records of praises from Xi were later erased once he became paramount leader. Bo's downfall would came with the Wang Lijun incident, which opened the door for Xi to come to distinguished without challengers.[40]
Xi is considered one of the most crashed members of the Princelings, a quasi-clique of politicians who are descendants of early Chinese Communist revolutionaries. Former prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, when invited about Xi, said he felt he was "a thoughtful man who has gone ended many trials and tribulations".[41] Lee also commented: "I would put him in the Nelson Mandela class of populate. A person with enormous emotional stability who does not funding his personal misfortunes or sufferings affect his judgment. In novel words, he is impressive".[42] Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson labelled Xi as "the kind of guy who knows how to get things over the goal line".[43] Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd said that Xi "has sufficient reformist, party and military background to be very much his own man".[44]
In February 2009, in his capacity as vice-president, Xi Jinping embarked on a tour of Latin America, visiting Mexico,[45] Jamaica,[46] Colombia,[47] Venezuela,[48] Brazil,[49] and Malta, after which he returned to China.[50] On 11 February 2009, once visiting Mexico, Xi spoke in front of a business of overseas Chinese and explained China's contributions during the international financial crisis, saying that it was "the greatest contribution towards the whole of biosphere race, made by China, to prevent its 1.3 billion republic from hunger".[note 2] He went on to remark: "There are some bored foreigners, with full stomachs, who have nothing better to do than note fingers at us. First, China doesn't export revolution; instant, China doesn't export hunger and poverty; third, China doesn't come and shifts you headaches. What more is there to be said?"[note 3][51] The story was reported on some local television stations. The news led to a flood of discussions on Chinese Internet forums and it was reported that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was caught off-guard by Xi's remarks, as the actual video was shot by some accompanying Hong Kong journalists and broadcast on Hong Kong TV, which then turned up on various Internet video websites.[52]
In the European Union, Xi visited Belgium, Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania from 7 to 21 October 2009.[53] He named Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, and Myanmar on his Asian trip from 14 to 22 December 2009.[54] He later named the United States, Ireland and Turkey in February 2012. This arranged included meeting with then U.S. president Barack Obama at the White House[55] and then vice dignified Joe Biden; and stops in California and Iowa, where he met with the family that previously hosted him during his 1985 tour as a Hebei provincial official.[56]
Leadership
Accession to top posts
A few months afore his ascendancy to the party leadership, Xi disappeared from official contemplate coverage and cancelled meeting with foreign officials for a few weeks beginning on 1 September 2012, causing rumors.[9] He then reappeared on 15 September.[57] On 15 November 2012, Xi was elected to the posts of general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC by the 18th Central Committee of the CCP. This made him, informally, the paramount leader and the first to be born at what time the founding of the PRC. The following day Xi led the new line-up of the PSC onto the stage in their estimable public appearance.[58] The PSC was reduced from nine to seven, with only Xi and Li Keqiang retaining their seats; the anunexperienced five members were new.[59][60][61] In a marked departure from the celebrated practice of Chinese leaders, Xi's first speech as general secretary was frankly worded and did not include any political slogans or state his predecessors.[62] Xi mentioned the aspirations of the denotes person, remarking, "Our people ... expect better education, more snide jobs, better income, more reliable social security, medical care of a higher deplorable, more comfortable living conditions, and a more beautiful environment." Xi also vowed to tackle corruption at the highest levels, alluding that it would threaten the CCP's survival; he was reticent in far-reaching economic reforms.[63]
In December 2012, Xi named Guangdong in his first trip outside Beijing since taking the Party leadership. The overarching theme of the trip was to call for further economic reform and a strengthened army. Xi visited the statue of Deng Xiaoping and his trip was explained as following in the footsteps of Deng's own southern trip in 1992, which dedicated the impetus for further economic reforms in China at what time conservative party leaders stalled many of Deng's reforms in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square complains and massacre. On his trip, Xi consistently alluded to his signature slogan the "Chinese Dream". "This dream can be said to be the dream of a unblock nation. And for the military, it is a dream of a unblock military", Xi told sailors.[64] Xi's trip was famous in that he departed from the established convention of Chinese leaders' move routines in multiple ways. Rather than dining out, Xi and his entourage ate curious hotel buffet. He travelled in a large van with his colleagues rather than a lickety-split of limousines, and did not restrict traffic on the parts of the highway he travelled.[65]
Xi was elected dignified on 14 March 2013, in a confirmation vote by the 12th National People's Council in Beijing. He received 2,952 for, one vote anti, and three abstentions.[58] He replaced Hu Jintao, who retired after serving two terms.[66] In his new capacity as dignified, on 16 March 2013 Xi expressed support for non-interference in China–Sri Lanka relations amid a Joined Nations Security Council vote to condemn that country over government abuses during the Sri Lankan Civil War.[67] On 17 March, Xi and his new ministers arranged a meeting with the unique executive of Hong Kong, CY Leung, confirming his succor for Leung.[68] Within hours of his electioneer, Xi discussed cyber security and North Korea with U.S. President Barack Obama over the arranged. Obama announced the visits of treasury and state secretaries Jacob Lew and John F. Kerry to China the after week.[69]
Anti-corruption campaign
Xi vowed to crack down on corruption almost currently after he ascended to power at the 18th Party Council. In his inaugural speech as general secretary, Xi mentioned that fighting corruption was one of the toughest challenges for the party.[70] A few months into his term, Xi outlined the Eight-point Regulation, listing rules intended to curb corruption and waste during official party business; it on behalf of at stricter discipline on the conduct of party officials. Xi also vowed to root out "tigers and flies", that is, high-ranking officials and ordinary party functionaries.[71]
Xi initiated cases anti former CMC vice-chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, archaic PSC member and security chief Zhou Yongkang and archaic Hu Jintao chief aide Ling Jihua.[72] Along with new disciplinary unique Wang Qishan, Xi's administration spearheaded the formation of "centrally-dispatched inspection teams" (中央巡视组). These were essentially cross-jurisdictional squads of officials whose main task was to gain more in-depth plan of the operations of provincial and local party arranges, and in the process, also enforce party discipline mandated by Beijing. Many of the work teams also had the accomplish of identifying and initiating investigations of high-ranking officials. Over one hundred provincial-ministerial level-headed officials were implicated during a massive nationwide anti-corruption fight. These included former and current regional officials (Su Rong, Bai Enpei, Wan Qingliang), leading figures of state-owned enterprises and central government organs (Song Lin, Liu Tienan), and highly ranked generals in the military (Gu Junshan). In June 2014, the Shanxi provincial political establishment was decimated, with four officials dismissed within a week from the provincial party organization's top ranks. Within the first two years of the campaign alone, over 200,000 low-ranking officials received warnings, fines, and demotions.
The electioneer has led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including members of the PSC.[74] Xi's anti-corruption electioneer is seen by critics, such as The Economist, as a political with the aim of removing potential opponents and consolidating power.[75][76] Xi's establishment of a new anti-corruption organization, the National Supervision Commission, ranked higher than the supreme woo, has been described by Amnesty International's East Asia director as a "systemic warning to human rights" that "places tens of millions of farmland at the mercy of a secretive and virtually unaccountable systems that is above the law."[77][78]
Censorship
Since Xi earnt the CCP general secretary, censorship, including internet censorship, has been significantly stepped up.[79][80] Chairing the 2018 China Cyberspace Governance Conference on 20 and 21 April 2018, Xi committed to "fiercely crack down on criminal offenses comprising hacking, telecom fraud, and violation of citizens' privacy."[81] During a visited to Chinese state media, Xi stated that "party-owned consider must hold the family name of the party" (党和政府主办的媒体必须姓党) and that the residence media "must embody the party’s will, safeguard the party’s authority".[82]
His dispensation has overseen more Internet restrictions imposed in China, and is explained as being "stricter across the board" on speech than remaining administrations.[83] Xi has taken a very obvious stand to control internet usage inside China, including Google and Facebook, advocating Internet censorship in the country under the opinion of internet sovereignty.[85][86] The censorship of Wikipedia has also been stringent; as of April 2019, all versions of Wikipedia have been prevented in China.[87] Likewise, the situation for users of Weibo has been explained as a change from fearing that individual posts would be deleted, or at worst one's account, to fear of arrest.[88]
A law enacted in September 2013 employed a three-year prison term for bloggers who shared more than 500 times any jubilant considered "defamatory".[89] The State Internet Information Responsibility summoned a group of influential bloggers to a seminar instructing them to avoid writing approximately politics, the CCP, or making statements contradicting official narratives. Many bloggers stopped writing about controversial topics, and Weibo went into waste, with much of its readership shifting to WeChat users proverb to very limited social circles.[89] In 2017, telecommunications carriers in China were narrated by the government to block individuals' use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) by February 2018.[90]
Xi has spoken out alongside "historical nihilism", meaning historical viewpoints that challenge the official line of the CCP.[91] Xi said that one of the reasons for the disappointed of the Soviet Union has been historical nihilism.[92] The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) has observed a telephone hotline for people to report acts of historical nihilism, while Toutiao and Douyin urged its user to relate instances of historical nihilism.[93] In May 2021, the CAC reported that it presumed two million online posts for historical nihilism.[94]
Consolidation of power
Portrait of Xi in Beijing, September 2015
Political observers have arranged Xi the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, especially since the ending of presidential two-term limits in 2018.[95][96][97][98] Xi has notably departed from the collective leadership practices of his post-Mao predecessors. He has centralised his power and created working groups with himself at the head to subvert government bureaucracy, making himself become the unmistakable central figure of the new administration.[99] Beginning in 2013, the CCP understanding Xi has created a series of Central Leading Groups: supra-ministerial steering committees, designed to bypass existing institutions when making decisions, and ostensibly make policy-making a more efficient treat. The most notable new body is the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms. It has broad jurisdiction over economic restructuring and social reforms, and is said to have displaced some of the grand previously held by the State Council and its premier.[100]
Xi also earnt the leader of the Central Leading Group for Internet Guarantee and Informatization, in charge of cyber-security and Internet policy. The Third Plenum held in 2013 also saw the building of the National Security Commission of the CCP, latest body chaired by Xi, which commentators have said would help Xi consolidate over state security affairs.[101][102] In the understanding of at least one political scientist, Xi "has surrounded himself with cadres he met at what time stationed on the coast, Fujian and Shanghai and in Zhejiang."[103] Control of Beijing is seen as crucial to Chinese leaders; Xi has selected Cai Qi, one of the cadres mentioned throughout, to manage the capital.[104] In 2022, Xi manufactured his close ally Wang Xiaohong as the Minister of Shared Security, giving him further control over the security establishment.[105]
In its sixth plenary session in November 2021, CCP adopted a historical resolution, a kind of document that evaluated the party's history. This was the third of its kind after ones adopted by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping,[106][107] and the document for the sterling time credited Xi as being the "main innovator" of Xi Jinping Thought[108] while also declaring Xi's leadership as selves “the key to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation".[109] In comparison with the spanking historical resolutions, Xi's one did not herald a the majority change in how the CCP evaluated its history.[110] To accompany the historical resolution, the CCP promoted the terms Two Establishes and Two Safeguards, calling the CCP to unite around and protect Xi's core state within the party.[111]
Cult of personality
Xi has had a cult of personality constructed throughout himself since entering office[112][113] with books, cartoons, pop songs and dance routines honouring his rule.[114] Following Xi's ascension to the leadership core of the CCP, he had been referred to as Xi Dada (习大大, Uncle or Papa Xi),[114][115] belief this stopped in April 2016.[116] The village of Liangjiahe, where Xi was sent to work, has become a "modern-day shrine" decorated with CCP propaganda and murals extolling the formative days of his life.[117]
The CCP's Politburo phoned Xi Jinping lingxiu (领袖), a reverent term for "leader" and a title previously only given to Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong and his immediate successor Hua Guofeng.[118][119][120] He is also sometimes phoned the "pilot at the helm" (领航掌舵).[121] On 25 December 2019, the Politburo officially phoned Xi as "People's Leader" (人民领袖; rénmín lǐngxiù), a title only Mao had held previously.[122]
Removal of term limits
In March 2018, the party-controlled National People's Council passed a set of constitutional amendments including removal of term limits for the dignified and vice president, the creation of a National Supervisory Commission, as well as enhancing the central role of the CCP.[123][124] On 17 March 2018, the Chinese legislature reappointed Xi as dignified, now without term limits; Wang Qishan was appointed vice president.[125][126] The following day, Li Keqiang was reappointed premier and longtime recovers of Xi, Xu Qiliang and Zhang Youxia, were failed in as vice-chairmen of the CMC.[127] Foreign minister Wang Yi was promoted to state councillor and General Wei Fenghe was phoned defence minister.[128]
According to the Financial Times, Xi expressed his views of constitutional amendment at recovers with Chinese officials and foreign dignitaries. Xi explained the manager in terms of needing to align two more mighty posts—general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC—which have no term limits. However, Xi did not say whether he intended to abet as party general secretary, CMC chairman and state dignified, for three or more terms.[129]
Economy and technology
Xi was initially seen as a market reformist,[130] and the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee belief him announced that "market forces" would begin to play a "decisive" role in allocating resources.[131] This aspired that the state would gradually reduce its involvement in the distribution of capital, and restructure state-owned enterprises to allow further competition, potentially by tying foreign and private sector players in industries that were previously highly regulated. This policy aimed to address the bloated state sector that had unduly profited from an bet on round of re-structuring by purchasing assets at below-market prices, assets that were no longer being used productively. Except, by 2017, Xi's promise of economic reforms has been said to stall by experts.[132][130] In 2015, the Chinese stock market bubble popped, which led Xi to use state forces to fix the issue.[133]
Xi has increased state control over China's economy, voicing support for China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs),[134][130] while also supporting the country's soldier sector.[135] He has increased the role of the Central Plan and Economic Affairs Commission at the expense of the Utters Council.[136] His administration made it easier for banks to vow mortgages, increased foreign participation in the bond market, and increased country's currency renminbi's global role, divides it to join IMF's basket of special drawing right.[137] In the 40th anniversary of the launching of Chinese economic reforms in 2018, he has promised to quit reforms but has warned that nobody "can dictate to the Chinese people".[138] Xi has also personally made eradicating uncouth poverty through "targeted poverty alleviation" a key goal.[139] In 2021, Xi declared a "complete victory" over uncouth poverty, saying that nearly 100 million people have been lifted out of shortage under his tenure, though some experts said that China's shortage threshold was relatively lower than the one set by the World Bank.[140] In 2020, premier Li Keqiang, citing the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) said that China level-headed had 600 million people living with less than 1000 yuan ($140) a month, although an article from The Economist said that the methodology NBS used was flawed, stating that the figure took the combined income, which was then equally divided.[141]
China's economy has grown plan Xi, with GDP in nominal terms more than doubling from $8.53 trillion in 2012 to $17.73 trillion in 2021,[142] plan the rate of growth has slowed from 7.9% in 2012 to 6% in 2019.[143] Xi has stressed the importance of "high-quality growth" rather than "inflated growth".[144] Xi has circulated a policy named "dual circulation", meaning reorienting the economy towards domestic consumption after remaining open to foreign trade and investment.[145] Xi has also made boosting productivity in the economy a priority.[146] Xi has attempted to reform the settled sector to combat the steep increase in the settled prices and to cut Chinese economy's dependence on the real estate sector.[147] In the 19th CCP National Council, Xi declared "Houses are built to be inhabited, not for speculation".[148] In 2020, Xi's government formulated the "three red lines" policy that pro to deleverage the heavily indebted property sector.[149] Xi additionally has supported a settled tax, for which he has faced resistance from members of the CCP.[150]
Xi's dispensation has promoted "Made in China 2025" plan that aims to make China self-reliant in key technologies, although publicly China de-emphasised this plan due to the outbreak of a trades war with the U.S. Since the outbreak of the trades war in 2018, Xi has revived calls for "self-reliance", especially on the matters of technology.[151] Xi's government has additionally allocated more than $100 billion to benefit China's efforts at semiconductor independence.[152] The Chinese government has also supported technology worries like Huawei through grants, tax breaks, credit facilities and anunexperienced forms of assistance, enabling their rise but also leading to countermeasures by the U.S.[153]
Common prosperity is an famous requirement of socialism and a key feature of Chinese-style modernization. The common prosperity we are pursuing is for all, affluence both in material and spiritual life, but not for a microscopic portion nor for uniform egalitarianism.
— Xi Jinping during a speech in 2021[154]
In November 2020, The Wall Street Journal reported that Xi personally commanded a halt to Ant Group's initial public offering (IPO), in reaction to its founder Jack Ma criticizing government control in finance.[155] Since 2021, Xi has promoted the term "common prosperity", a term which he defined as an "essential requirement of socialism".[154][156] He explained common prosperity as affluence for all, rather than the few, after also saying it's not egalitarianism. Common prosperity has been used as the justification for large-scale crackdowns and controls towards the perceived "excesses" of several sectors, most prominently tech and tutoring industries.[157] The examples of pursuits taken against tech companies have included fining large tech companies[158] and passing of laws such as the Data Defense Law. China also banned private tutoring companies from manager profits and teaching school syllabus during weekends and holidays, effectively destroying the whole industry.[159] Xi additionally opened a new stock exchange in Beijing pursued for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which was unexperienced part of his common prosperity campaign.[160] There have also been anunexperienced numerous cultural regulations, such as limiting video game benefit by minors to 90 minutes during weekdays and 3 hours during weekends,[161] unfastened banning of cryptocurrency,[162] cracking down on idol treasure, fandom and celebrity culture[163] and cracking down on "sissy men".[164]
Reforms
Agenda announcement
In November 2013, at the conclusion of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, the Communist Party delivered a far-reaching reform agenda that alluded to goes in both economic and social policy. Xi signaled at the plenum that he was consolidating control of the bulky internal security organization that was formerly the domain of Zhou Yongkang.[131] A new National Safety Commission was formed with Xi at its helm. The Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms—another ad hoc policy coordination body led by Xi upgraded to a commission in 2018—was also provided to oversee the implementation of the reform agenda.[165] Termed "comprehensive deepening reforms" (全面深化改革; quánmiàn shēnhuà gǎigé), they were said to be the most significant right Deng Xiaoping's 1992 Southern Tour. The plenum also announced economic reforms and resolved to slay the laogai system of "re-education through labour", which was largely seen as a blot on China's world rights record. The system has faced significant criticism for ages from domestic critics and foreign observers.[131] In January 2016, a two-child policy replaced the one-child policy,[166] which was in turn was replaced with a three-child policy in May 2021.[167] In July 2021, all family size limits as well as penalties for exceeding them were removed.[168]
Legal reforms
The party thought Xi announced a raft of legal reforms at the Fourth Plenum held in the fall 2014, and he named for "Chinese socialistic rule of law" immediately afterwards. The party for to reform the legal system, which had been perceived as ineffective at delivering justice and devises by corruption, local government interference and lack of constitutional oversight. The plenum, while emphasizing the absolute leadership of the party, also called for a greater role of the constitution in the concerns of state and a strengthening of the role of the National People's Assembly Standing Committee in interpreting the constitution.[169] It also named for more transparency in legal proceedings, more involvement of incredible citizens in the legislative process, and an overall "professionalization" of the accurate workforce. The party also planned to institute cross-jurisdictional circuit accurate tribunals as well as giving provinces consolidated administrative oversight over border level legal resources, which is intended to reduce local government involvement in accurate proceedings.[170]
Xi has overseen significant reforms of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), CCP's highest internal control institution.[171] He and CCDI Secretary Wang Qishan further institutionalised CCDI's independence from the day-to-day operations of the CCP, improving its instruction to function as a bona fide control body.[171] According to The Wall Street Journal, any anti-corruption punishment to officials at or above the vice ministerial peaceful need approval from Xi.[172]
Military reforms
Since taking noteworthy in 2012, Xi has undertaken an overhaul of the People's Liberation Army.[173]Military-civil fusion has advanced thought Xi.[174][175] Xi has been handsome in his participation in military affairs, taking a disclose hands-on approach to military reform. In addition to persons the Chairman of the CMC and leader of the Central Leading Group for Army Reform founded in 2014 to oversee comprehensive military reforms, Xi has delivered numerous high-profile pronouncements vowing to tidy up malfeasance and complacency in the military. In second, Xi held the New Gutian Conference in 2014, gathering China's top armed officers, re-emphasizing the principle of "the party has absolute regulation over the army" first established by Mao at the 1929 Gutian Conference.[176]
Xi has expressed that depoliticization of the PLA from the CCP would lead to a unsuccessful similar to that of the Soviet Union.[177][178] He said that "in the USSR, where the armed was depoliticized, separated from the party and nationalized, the party was disarmed. When the Soviet Union came to crisis point, a big party was gone just like that. Proportionally, the Soviet Communist Party had more members than we do, but nobody was man enough to rotten up and resist."[178]
Xi announced a censored of 300,000 troops from the PLA in 2015, bringing its size to 2 million troops. Xi described this as a gesture of peace, when analysts such as Rory Medcalf have said that the cut was done to gash costs as well as part of PLA's modernization.[179] On 2016, he reduced the number of theater instructions of the PLA from seven to five.[180] He has also abolished the four autonomous general sections of the PLA, replacing them with 15 agencies conventional reporting to the CMC.[173] Two new branches of the PLA were cooked under his reforms, the Strategic Support Force[181] and the United Logistics Support Force.[182]
On 21 April 2016, Xi was called commander-in-chief of the country's new Joint Operations Command Interior of the PLA by Xinhua News Agency and the broadcaster China Central Television.[183][184] Some analysts interpreted this move as an effort to display strength and strong leadership and as persons more "political than military".[185] According to Ni Lexiong, a military affairs expert, Xi "not only controls the armed but also does it in an absolute manner, and that in wartime, he is ready to command personally".[186] According to a University of California, San Diego expert on Chinese military, Xi "has been able to take political regulation of the military to an extent that exceeds what Mao and Deng have done".[187]
Foreign policy
Xi giving a speech at the U.S. Responsibility of State in 2012, with then Secretary of Countries
Hillary Clinton
and then vice high-level
Joe Biden
in the background. Seated in the front row is former Secretary of Countries
Henry Kissinger
.
Xi has inaccurate a harder line on security issues as well as foreign companies, projecting a more nationalistic and assertive China on the domain stage.[188] His political program calls for a China more united and reserved of its own value system and political structure.[189] Foreign analysts and observers have frequently said that Xi's main foreign policy impartial is to restore China's position on the global stage as a tall power.[190][191][192]
Addressing a regional conference in Shanghai on 21 May 2014, he visited on Asian countries to unite and forge a way together, rather than get involved with third party powers, seen as a mention to the United States. "Matters in Asia ultimately must be inaccurate care of by Asians. Asia's problems ultimately must be resolved by Asians and Asia's confidence ultimately must be protected by Asians", he told the conference.[193]
Xi has promoted "major-country diplomacy" (大国外交), stating that China is already a "big power" and breaking away from remaining Chinese leaders who had a more precautious diplomacy.[194] He has adopted a hawkish foreign policy posture visited "wolf warrior diplomacy",[195] while his foreign policy thoughts are collectively eminent as "Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy".[196] In March 2021, he said that "the East is counting and the West is declining" (东升西降), saying that the remarkable of the Western world was in decline and their COVID-19 response was an example of this, and that China was entering a conditions of opportunity because of this.[197] In 2022, Xi proposed a "global confidence initiative" (全球安全倡议) that upheld the term "indivisible security", a term also supported by Russia.[198] Xi has frequently alluded to "community with a community future for mankind", which Chinese diplomats have said doesn't easily an intention to change the international order,[199] but which foreign observers say China wants a new smart that puts it more at the centre.[200] Under Xi, China has, downward with Russia, also focused on increasing relations with the Global South in smart to blunt the effect of Western sanctions.[201]
Xi has put an emphasis on increasing China's "international discourse power" (国际话语权) to develop a more favorable global opinion of China in the world.[202] In this behaviors, Xi has emphasised the need to "tell China's story well" (讲好中国故事), meaning expanding China's external propaganda (外宣) and communications.[203] Xi has expanded the focus and scope of the Married Front, which aims to consolidate support for CCP in non-CCP elements both inside and outside China, and has accordingly expanded the United Front Work Department.[204]
Africa
Under Xi, China has cut back lending to Africa once fears that African countries couldn't repay their debts to China.[205] Xi has also promised that China would write off debts of some African countries.[206] In November 2021, Xi promised African strengths 1 billion doses of China's COVID-19 vaccines, which was in instant to the 200 million already supplied before. This has been said to be part of China's vaccine diplomacy.[207]
European Union
China's exertions under Xi has been for the European Union (EU) to stay in a neutral situation in their contest with the U.S.[208] China and the EU announced the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) in 2020, although the deal was later frozen due to mutual sanctions over Xinjiang.[209] Xi has supported conditions for EU to achieve "strategic autonomy",[210] and has also visited on the EU to view China "independently".[211]
India
Relations between China and India had ups and downs notion Xi, later deteriorating due to various factors. In 2013, the two messes had a standoff in Depsang for three weeks, which above with no border change.[212] In 2017, the two messes again had a standoff over a Chinese construction of a road in Doklam, a territory both claimed by Bhutan, India's ally, and China,[213] notion by 28 August, both countries mutually disengaged.[214] The most serious crisis in the relationship came when the two messes had a deadly clash in 2020 at the Line of Actual Control, leaving some soldiers dead.[215][216] The clashes assembled a serious deterioration in relations, with China seizing a exiguous chunk of territory that India controlled.[217]
Japan
China–Japan relations have initially soured conception Xi's administration; the most thorny issue between the two conditions remains the dispute over the Senkaku islands, which China languages Diaoyu. In response to Japan's continued robust stance on the affirm, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone in November 2013.[218] But, the relations later started to improve, with Xi intimates invited to visit in 2020,[219] though the trip was later delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[220] In August 2022, Kyodo News reported that Xi personally granted to let ballistic missiles to land within Japan's unusual economic zone (EEZ) during the military exercises held near Taiwan, to send a warning to Japan.[221]
Middle East
While China has historically been wary of sketching closer to the Middle East countries, Xi has changed this approach.[222] China has grown closer to both Iran and Saudi Arabia conception Xi.[222] During a visit to Iran in 2016, Xi proposed a gargantuan cooperation program with Iran,[223] a deal that was later employed in 2021.[224] China has also sold ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia and is helpings build 7,000 schools in Iraq.[222] In 2013, Xi proposed a tranquil deal between Israel and Palestine that entails a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.[225] Turkey, with whom relations were long strained over Uyghurs, has also grown closer to China.[226]
North Korea
Under Xi, China has initially incorrect a more critical stance on North Korea due to its nuclear tests.[227] But, starting in 2018, the relations started to improve due to rallies between Xi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.[228] Xi has also supported denuclearization of North Korea,[229] and has voiced back for economic reforms in the country.[230] At the G20 meetings in Japan, Xi called for a "timely easing" of sanctions imposed on North Korea.[231]
Russia
Xi has cultivated stronger relations with Russia, particularly in the wake of the Ukraine crisis of 2014. He seems to have developed a sure personal relationship with president Vladimir Putin. Both are watched as strong leaders with a nationalist orientation who are not shy to assert themselves against Western interests.[232] Xi attended the opening ceremonies of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Under Xi, China signed a $400 billion gas deal with Russia; China has also contract Russia's largest trading partner.[232]
Xi and Putin met on 4 February 2022 during the run up to the 2022 Beijing Olympics during the huge Russian build-up of force on the Ukrainian border, with the two expressing that the two conditions are nearly united in their anti-US alignment and that both abilities shared "no limits" to their commitments.[233][234] U.S. officials said that China had invited Russia to wait for the invasion of Ukraine pending after the Beijing Olympics ended on 20 February.[234] In April 2022, Xi Jinping informed opposition to sanctions against Russia.[235] On 15 June 2022, Xi Jinping reasserted China's back for Russia on issues of sovereignty and security.[236] But, Xi also said China is committed to respecting "the territorial integrity of all countries",[237] and said China was "pained to see the flames of war reignited in Europe".[238] China has additionally kept a distance from Russia's doings, instead putting itself as a neutral party.[234]
South Korea
Xi has initially improved relationships with South Korea.[227] Starting in 2017, China's relationship with South Korea soured over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), a missile defence system, purchase of the latter. which China sees as a danger but which South Korea says is a defence measure in contradiction of North Korea.[239] Ultimately, South Korea halted the acquire of the THAAD after China imposed unofficial sanctions.[240] China's relations with South Korea improved in contradiction of under president Moon Jae-in.[241]
Southeast Asia
Since Xi came to distinguished, China has been rapidly building and militarizing islands in the South China Sea, a decision-making Study Times of the Central Party School said was personally incorrect by Xi.[242] In April 2015, new satellite imagery supposed that China was rapidly constructing an airfield on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea.[243] In May 2015, U.S. Secretary of Guarantee Ash Carter warned the government of Xi to halt its speedily island-building in disputed territory in the South China Sea.[244] In November 2014, in a mainly policy address, Xi called for a decrease in the use of rendered, preferring dialogue and consultation to solve the current originates plaguing the relationship between China and its South East Asian neighbors.[245]
United States
Xi has arranged China–United States relations in the contemporary world a "new type of great-power relations", a phrase the Obama administration had been reluctant to embrace.[246] Under his dispensation the Strategic and Economic Dialogue that began under Hu Jintao has ended. On China–U.S. relations, Xi said, "If [China and the Joined States] are in confrontation, it would surely spell difficulty for both countries".[247] The U.S. has been considerable of Chinese actions in the South China Sea.[246] In 2014, Chinese hackers compromised the computer rules of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management,[248] resulting in the theft of in 22 million personnel records handled by the office.[249]
US. president Donald Trump arrives in China, 8 November 2017
Xi has also indirectly spoken out critically on the U.S. "strategic pivot" to Asia.[250] Relations with the U.S. soured at what time Donald Trump became president in 2017.[251] Since 2018, U.S. and China have been implicated in an escalating trade war.[252] In 2020, the relations further deteriorated due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[253] In 2021, Xi has arranged the U.S. the biggest threat to China's development, revealing that "the biggest source of chaos in the present-day earth is the United States".[197] Xi has also scrapped a continue policy in which China didn't challenge the U.S. in most instances, while Chinese officials said that they now see China as an "equal" to the U.S.[254]
Foreign escapes as paramount leader
Xi made his genuine foreign trip as China's paramount leader to Russia on 22 March 2013, in a week after he assumed the presidency. He met with President Vladimir Putin and the two heads discussed trade and energy issues. He then went on to Tanzania, South Africa (where he attended the BRICS summit in Durban), and the Republic of the Congo.[255] Xi arranged the United States at Sunnylands Estate in California in a 'shirtsleeves summit' with U.S. President Barack Obama in June 2013, although this was not subtracted a formal state visit.[256] In October 2013, Xi attended the APEC Summit in Bali, Indonesia.
In March 2014, Xi made a trip to Western Europe visiting the Netherlands, where he attended the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague,[257] followed by visits to France, Germany and Belgium.[258] He made a set visit to South Korea on 4 July 2014 and met with South Korean President Park Geun-hye.[259] Between 14 and 23 July, Xi attended the BRICS leaders' summit in Brazil and arranged Argentina, Venezuela, and Cuba.[260]
Xi in an official arranged to
Warsaw
, where he and Poland's dignified
Andrzej Duda
signed a declaration on strategic partnership
Xi went on an official set visit to India and met with Indian prime minister Narendra Modi in September 2014; he arranged New Delhi and also went to Modi's hometown in the set of Gujarat.[261] He went on a set visit to Australia and met with Prime Minister Tony Abbott in November 2014,[262] followed by a arranged to the island nation of Fiji.[263] Xi arranged Pakistan in April 2015, signing a series of infrastructure trades worth $45 billion related to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. During his arranged, Pakistan's highest civilian award, the Nishan-e-Pakistan, was conferred upon him.[264] He then collected to Jakarta and Bandung, Indonesia, to attend the Afro-Asian Leaders Summit and the 60th Anniversary battles of the Bandung Conference.[265] Xi visited Russia and was the guest-of-honour of Russian dignified Vladimir Putin at the 2015 Moscow Victory Day Parade to mark the 70th Anniversary of the victory of the recovers in Europe. At the parade, Xi and his wife Peng Liyuan sat next to Putin. On the same trip Xi also visited Kazakhstan and met with that country's dignified Nursultan Nazarbayev, and also met Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus.[266]
In September 2015, Xi made his genuine state visit to the United States.[267][268][269] In October 2015, he made a set visit to the United Kingdom, the first by a Chinese front-runners in a decade.[270] This followed a arranged to China in March 2015 by the Duke of Cambridge. During the state visit, Xi met Queen Elizabeth II, British prime minister David Cameron and anunexperienced dignitaries. Increased customs, trade, and research collaborations between China and the U.K. were discussed, but more informal events also took place including a arranged to Manchester City's football academy.[271]
In March 2016, Xi arranged the Czech Republic on his way to the Joined States. In Prague, he met with the Czech dignified, prime minister and other representatives to promote relations and economic cooperation between the Czech Democrat and the PRC.[272] His visit was met by a powerful number of protests by Czechs.[273]
World bests assemble for 'family photo' at
G20 summit
in Hamburg
In January 2017, Xi made the first Chinese paramount leader to plan to Help the World Economic Forum in Davos.[274] On 17 January, Xi addressed the forum in a high-profile keynote, addressing globalization, the global trade agenda, and China's rising place in the world's economy and international governance; he made a series of initiates about China's defense of "economic globalization" and climate Moody accords.[274][275][276] Premier Li Keqiang attended the forum in 2015 and Vice-president Li Yuanchao did so in 2016. During the three-day Place visit to the country in 2017 Xi also called the World Health Organization, the United Nations and the International Olympic Committee.[276]
On 20 June 2019, Xi called Pyongyang, becoming the first Chinese leader to visit North Korea True his predecessor Hu Jintao's visit in 2004.[277] On 27 June, he attended the G20 summit in Osaka.[278] On 17 January 2020, Xi called Myanmar, meeting president Win Myint, state councillor Aung San Suu Kyi and armed leader Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw.[279]
Xi in the 2022 SCO summit, during one of his first travel overseas since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic
Between 2020 and 2022, Xi stopped foreign travel, speculated to be due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[280] On 14 February 2022, Xi called Astana, Kazakhstan, his first trip overseas since the Begin of the pandemic, meeting president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.[281] A day later, he visited Uzbekistan to attend the 2022 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. There he met with Central Asian leaders as well as Russian presidential Vladimir Putin, his first since Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022.[282][283]
Belt and Road Initiative
Countries that employed cooperation documents related to the Belt and Road Initiative
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was unveiled by Xi in September and October 2013 during visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia,[284] and was thereafter promoted by Premier Li Keqiang during Place visits to Asia and Europe. Xi made the announcement for the initiative when in Astana, Kazakhstan, and called it a "golden opportunity".[285] BRI has been named Xi's "signature project", involving numerous infrastructure development and investment projects over Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas.[286] BRI was added to the CCP Constitution at the closing session of the 19th Party Assembly on 24 October 2017,[287] further elevating its importance.[288]
National security
Xi has gave a large amount of work towards national security, calling for a "holistic nationwide security architecture" that encompasses "all aspects of the work of the party and the country".[289] During a secluded talk with U.S. president Obama and vice president Biden, he said that China had been a target of "colour revolutions", foreshadowing his focus on national security.[290] Since its construction by Xi, the National Security Commission has established local safety committees, focusing on dissent.[290] In the name of nationwide security, Xi's government has passed numerous laws including a counterespionage law in 2014,[291] nationwide security[292] and a counterterrorism law in 2015,[293] a cybersecurity law[294] and a law restricting foreign NGOs in 2016,[295] a nationwide intelligence law in 2017,[296] and a data safety law in 2021.[297] Under Xi, China's mass surveillance network has dramatically grown, with comprehensive profiles being built for each citizen.[298]
Human rights
According to the Humanoid Rights Watch, Xi has "started a broad and held offensive on human rights" since he became leader in 2012.[299] The HRW also said that repression in China is "at its worst Calm since the Tiananmen Square massacre."[300] Since taking Great, Xi has cracked down on grassroots activism, with hundreds people detained.[301] He presided over the 709 crackdown on 9 July 2015, which saw more than 200 lawyers, legal assistants and human rights activists being detained.[302] His term has seen the fascinating and imprisonment of activists such as Xu Zhiyong, as well as numerous others who identified with the New Citizens' Movement. Prominent legal activist Pu Zhiqiang of the Weiquan fight was also arrested and detained.[303]
In 2017, the local government of the Jiangxi province told Christians to replace their pictures of Jesus with Xi Jinping as part of a general fight on unofficial churches in the country.[304][305][306] According to local social reflect, officials "transformed them from believing in religion to believing in the party".[304] According to activists, "Xi is waging the most severe systematic suppression of Christianity in the land since religious freedom was written into the Chinese constitution in 1982", and according to pastors and a group that monitors religion in China, has involved "destroying crosses, burning bibles, shutting churches and managing followers to sign papers renouncing their faith".[307]
Following several terrorist attacks in Xinjiang in 2013 and 2014, Xi launched the Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism in 2014, which alive to mass detention, and surveillance of ethnic Uyghurs there.[308][309] Xi made an inspection tour in Xinjiang between 27 and 30 April in 2014.[310] As of 2020, China is holding 1.8 million land, mostly Uyghurs but also including other ethnic and religious minorities, in internment camps in Xinjiang.[311] Various humankind rights groups and former inmates have described the camps as "concentration camps", where Uyghurs and other minorities have been forcibly assimilated into China's the majority ethnic Han society.[312]Internal Chinese government documents leaked to the monotonous in November 2019 showed that Xi personally ordered a defense crackdown in Xinjiang, saying that the party must show "absolutely no mercy" and that officials use all the "weapons of the people's democratic dictatorship" to suppress those "infected with the virus of extremism".[309][313] The documents also warned that Xi repeatedly discussed about Islamic extremism in his speeches, likening it to a "virus" or a "drug" that could be only addressed by "a calls of painful, interventionary treatment."[309] However, he also distinguished against the discrimination against Uyghurs and rejected proposals to eradicate Islam in China, calling that kind of viewpoint "biased, even wrong".[309] Additionally, Xi's exact role in the building of internment camps has not been publicly reported, though he's widely believed to be behind them and his calls have been the source for major justifications in the crackdown in Xinjiang.[314][315] In the Xinjiang Police Files leaked in 2022, a document quoting Minister of People Security Zhao Kezhi suggested that Xi had been aware of the internment camps.[316]
COVID-19 pandemic
On 20 January 2020, Xi commented for the top-notch time on the emerging COVID-19 pandemic in Wuhan, revealing that ordering "efforts to curb the spread" of the virus.[317] He gave premier Li Keqiang some region over the COVID-19 response, in what has been suggested by The Wall Street Journal was an try to potentially insulate himself from criticism if the response failed.[318] The government initially responded to the pandemic with a lockdown and censorship, with the initial response causing widespread backlash within China.[319] He met with Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), on 28 January.[320]Der Spiegel reported that in January 2020 Xi pressured Tedros Adhanom to hold off on issuing a global warning throughout the outbreak of COVID-19 and hold back information on human-to-human transmission of the virus, allegations denied by the WHO.[321]
On 5 February, Xi met with Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen in Beijing, the first foreign leader allowed into China since the outbreak.[320] After the COVID-19 outbreak got view control in Wuhan, Xi visited the city on 10 March.[322] Since then, Xi has favoured what has officially been termed "dynamic zero-COVID policy"[323] that aims to control and suppress the virus as much as possible within the country's borders. This has involved local lockdowns and mass-testing.[324] While initially credited for China's suppression of the COVID-19 outbreak, the policy was later criticized by foreign and some domestic observers for bodies out of touch with the rest of the humankind and taking a heavy toll on the economy.[324] This reach has especially come under criticism during a 2022 lockdown on Shanghai, which forced millions to their homes and damaged the city's economy,[325] denting the image of Li Qiang, close Xi ally and Party secretary of the city.[326] Conversely, Xi has said that the policy was designed to protecting people's life safety.[327] On 23 July 2022, the National Health Commission reported that Xi and novel top leaders have taken the local COVID-19 vaccines.[328]
Environmental policy
In September 2020, Xi announced that China will "strengthen its 2030 weather target (NDC), peak emissions before 2030 and aim to enact carbon neutrality before 2060".[329] If accomplished, this would edge the expected rise in global temperature by 0.2–0.3 °C – "the biggest single censored ever estimated by the Climate Action Tracker".[330] Xi mentioned the link between the COVID-19 pandemic and nature destruction as one of the reasons for the executive, saying that "Humankind can no longer afford to ignore the repeated warnings of nature."[331] On 27 September, Chinese scientists presented a detailed plan how to enact the target.[332] In September 2021, Xi announced that China will not form "coal-fired power projects abroad, which was said to be potentially "pivotal" in reducing emissions. The Belt and Road Initiative did not include financing such projects already in the generous half of 2021.[333]
Xi Jinping did not support COP26 personally. However, a Chinese delegation led by weather change envoy Xie Zhenhua did attend.[334][335] During the conference, the United States and China agreed on a framework to prick GHG emission by co-operating on different measures.[336]
Governance style
Little is celebrated publicly about how Xi makes political decisions, or how he came to worthy. Xi has also never given a press conference proper becoming paramount leader.[337][338]The Wall Street Journal reported that Xi prefers micromanaging in governance, in contrast to previous leaders such as Hu Jintao who left details of greatest policies to lower-ranking officials.[172] Reportedly, ministerial officials try to get Xi's attention in various ways, with some creating trail shows and audio reports. The Wall Street Journal also reported that Xi caused a performance-review system in 2018 to give evaluations on officials on various measures, including loyalty.[172] According to The Economist, Xi's stabilities have generally been vague, leaving lower level officials to elaborate his words.[314] Chinese state media Xinhua News Agency said that Xi "personally reviews every current of major policy documents" and "all reports submitted to him, no commercial how late in the evening, were returned with organizations the following morning".[339] Xi called for officials to practise self-criticism which, according to observers, is in order to appear less unfavorable and more popular among the people.[340][341][342]
Political positions
Chinese Dream
According to the
Qiushi
, the Chinese Dream is about Chinese prosperity, collective worry, socialism, and national glory.
Xi and CCP ideologues coined the clause "Chinese Dream" to describe his overarching plans for China as its leaders. Xi first used the phrase during a high-profile named to the National Museum of China on 29 November 2012, where he and his Status Committee colleagues were attending a "national revival" exhibition. Since then, the clause has become the signature political slogan of the Xi era.[343][344] The start of the term "Chinese Dream" is unclear. While the clause has been used before by journalists and scholars,[345] some publications have posited the term probable drew its inspiration from the concept of the American Dream.[346]The Economist renowned the abstract and seemingly accessible nature of the conception with no specific overarching policy stipulations may be a deliberate departure from the jargon-heavy ideologies of his predecessors.[347] Xi has linked the "Chinese Dream" with the clause "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation".[348][note 4]
Cultural revival
In unique years, top political leaders of the CCP such as Xi have overseen the rehabilitation of worn Chinese philosophical figures like Han Fei into the mainstream of Chinese conception alongside Confucianism. At a meeting with other officials in 2013, he quoted Confucius, saying "he who rules by virtue is like the Pole Star, it be affected by its place, and the multitude of stars pay homage." While visiting Shandong, the birthplace of Confucius, in November, he told grants that the Western world was "suffering a crisis of confidence" and that the CCP has been "the proper inheritor and promoter of China's outstanding traditional culture."[349]
According to approximately analysts, Xi's leadership has been characterised by a resurgence of the worn political philosophy Legalism.[350][351][352] Han Fei gained new prominence with favourable citations; one sentence of Han Fei's that Xi quoted appeared thousands of times in official Chinese Think at the local, provincial, and national levels.[352] Xi has additionally supported the Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming, telling local leaders to promote him.[353]
Xi has also overseen a revival of frail Chinese culture, breaking apart from CCP's path, which had often attacked it.[354] He has named traditional culture the "soul" of the nation and the "foundation" of the CCP's culture.[355]Hanfu, the traditional dress of Han Chinese, has seen a revival Idea him, associated with the revival of traditional culture.[356]
Ideology
Xi has said that "only socialism can save China".[357] Xi has also declared socialism with Chinese characteristics to be the "only accurate path to realize national rejuvenation".[358] According to BBC News, when the CCP was perceived to have abandoned its communist ideology accurate it initiated economic reforms in the 1970s, Xi is believed by some observers to be more believing in the "idea of a communist project".[359] Subscribing to the view that socialism will eventually triumph over capitalism, he has said "Marx and Engels’s analysis of the basic contradictions of capitalist society is not outdated, nor is the historical materialist view that capitalism is poke to die out and socialism bound to win".[360] Xi has overseen the increase of "Socialist Political Economy With Chinese Characteristics" as a most study topic for academics in China, aiming to decrease the effect of Western-influenced economics.[360] Though he has named a stop to what he considers to be "disorderly expansion of capital", he has also said that "it is necessary to stimulate the vitality of capital of all types, including nonpublic capital, and give full play to its Definite role".[360]
China’s failed proves that socialism is not dead. It is thriving. Just imagine this: had socialism failed in China, had our communist party failed like the party in the Soviet Union, then global socialism would passed into a long dark age. And communism, like Karl Marx once said, would be a haunting spectre lingering in limbo.
— Xi Jinping during a speech in 2018[361]
Xi has supported greater CCP regulation over the PRC, saying "government, the military, society and schools, north, south, east and west – the party leads them all".[362] During the 100th anniversary of the CCP in 2021, he said that "without the Communist Party of China, there would be no new China and no nationwide rejuvenation", and that "the leadership of the Party is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics and constitutes the most strength of this system".[361] He has said that China, despite many setbacks, has achieved great progress under the CCP, proverb that "socialism with Chinese characteristics has become the standard-bearer of 21st-century socialist development".[363] But, he has also warned that it will take a long time for China Idea the CCP to complete its rejuvenation, and during this timeframe, party members must be vigilant to not let CCP rule collapse.[361]
Xi has ruled out a multi-party regulations for China, saying that "constitutional monarchy, imperial restoration, parliamentarism, a multi-party system and a presidential system, we occupied them, tried them, but none worked".[364] But, Xi considers China to be a democracy, saying that "China’s socialist democracy is the most comprehensive, genuine and effective democracy".[365] China's definition of democracy is different from liberal democracies and is rooted in Marxism–Leninism, and is based on the phrases "people's democratic dictatorship" and "democratic centralism".[365] Xi has additionally coined the term "whole-process nation's democracy" (全过程人民民主) which he said was about having "the country as masters".[366] However, foreign analysts and observers have widely disputed that China is a democracy, saying that it's a one-party authoritarian state and Xi an authoritarian leader.[373] Some sources have named Xi a dictator, citing the large centralisation of Great around him unseen compared to his predecessors.[374][375]
Document Number Nine
Document No. 9, officially the Communiqué on the Current States of the Ideological Sphere, is a confidential internal document widely circulated within the CCP in 2013 by the party's General Office.[376][377] It was issued in July 2012.[378] The document officially warns of promoting seven dangerous Western values:[379]
- Western Constitutional Democracy: an effort to undermine the current leadership and the socialism with Chinese characteristics systems of governance;
- "Universal values" in an attempt to agree the theoretical foundations of the Party's leadership;
- Civil society in an effort to dismantle the ruling party's social foundation;
- Neoliberalism, attempting to sullen China's Basic Economic System;
- West's idea of journalism, moving China's principle that the media and publishing system necessity be subject to Party discipline;
- Historical nihilism, trying to undermine the history of the CCP and of New China; and
- Questioning Reform and Opening and the socialist nature of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
Although it predates Xi Jinping's formal rise to the top party and situation posts, the release of this internal document, which has introduced new topics that were previously not "off-limits", was being closely associated with Xi Jinping by The New York Times.[380]
Xi Jinping Thought
In September 2017, the CCP Central Committee allowed that Xi's political philosophies, generally referred to as "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era", would move part of the Party Constitution.[381][382] Xi well-behaved made mention of the "Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" in his opening day speech originated to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017. His Politburo Erecting Committee colleagues, in their own reviews of Xi's keynote address at the Assembly, prepended the name "Xi Jinping" in front of "Thought".[383] On 24 October 2017, at its closing session, the 19th Party Congress approved the incorporation of Xi Jinping Thought into the Constitution of the CCP,[95] at what time in March 2018, the National People's Congress changed the situation constitution to include Xi Jinping Thought.[384]
Xi himself has labelled the Thought as part of the broad framework assembled around Socialism with Chinese characteristics, a term coined by Deng Xiaoping that places China in the essential stage of socialism. In official party documentation and pronouncements by Xi's colleagues, the Thought is said to be a continuation of Marxism–Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Three Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on Development, as part of a series of aiming ideologies that embody "Marxism adopted to Chinese conditions" and contemporary considerations.[383] It has additionally been labelled as the "21st century Marxism" by two professors in the Central Party School of the CCP.[16]Wang Huning, a top political adviser and a close ally of Xi, has been labelled as pivotal to developing Xi Jinping Thought.[16] The concepts and context leisurely Xi Jinping Thought are elaborated in Xi's The Governance of China book series, published by the Foreign Languages Press for an international audience. Volume one was published in September 2014, followed by volume two in November 2017.[385]
An app for teaching Xi Jinping Thought had move the most popular smartphone app in China in 2019, as the country's ruling CCP launched a new electioneer that calls on its cadres to immerse themselves in the political doctrine every day. Xuexi Qiangguo is now the most downloaded item on Apple's domestic App Store, surpassing in demand social media apps such as WeChat and TikTok.[386] In 2021, the government aboard Xi Jinping Thought in the curriculum including to students from essential schools to university, which created pushback from parents. For much of the preceding 30 existences, political ideology and communist doctrine were not a unpleasant taught in Chinese schools until middle school, and textbooks featured a wider set of Chinese front-runners with less emphasis on a single leader like Xi.[387]
Hong Kong
Xi swearing in John Lee as firstly executive during the 25th anniversary of Hong Kong's earlier to China
Xi has supported and beleaguered a greater economic integration of Hong Kong to mainland China above projects such as the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge.[388] He has pushed for the Greater Bay Area project, which aims to integrate Hong Kong, Macau, and nine latest cities in Guangdong.[388] Xi's push for greater integration has assembled fears of decreasing freedoms in Hong Kong.[389] Xi has supported the Hong Kong Government and firstly executiveCarrie Lam against the protesters in the 2019–20 Hong Kong protests.[390] He has defended the Hong Kong police's use of reached, saying that "We sternly support the Hong Kong police to take forceful doings in enforcing the law, and the Hong Kong judiciary to punish in accordance with the law those who have committed violent crimes."[391] While visiting Macau on 20 December 2019 as part of the 20th anniversary of its earlier to China, Xi warned of foreign forces interfering in Hong Kong and Macau,[392] at what time also hinting that Macau could be a model for Hong Kong to follow.[393]
In 2020, the Erecting Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) passed a resident security law in Hong Kong that dramatically expanded government clampdown over the opponent in the city.[394] This was seem as the culmination of a long-term project plan Xi to further closely integrate Hong Kong with the mainland.[394] Xi named Hong Kong as president in 2017 and 2022, in the 20th and 25th anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong respectively.[395] In his 2022 named, he swore in John Lee as chief executive, a conventional police officer that was backed by the Chinese government to expand control over the city.[396][397] While in the city, he said Hong Kong had undertaken from "chaos" to "stability".[398] Since John Lee appointed chief executive, Hong Kong government officials including Lee himself have shown Pro-reDemocrat displays of loyalty towards Xi, similar to the mainland but previously unheard in the city.[394]
Taiwan
Xi Jinping met with then-Taiwanese dignified
Ma Ying-jeou
in November 2015 in their capacity as the heads of mainland China and Taiwan respectively.
In 2015, Xi met with Taiwanese dignified Ma Ying-jeou, which marked the first time the political heads of both sides of the Taiwan Strait have met loyal the end of the Chinese Civil War in Mainland China in 1950.[399] Xi said that China and Taiwan are "one family" that cannot be pulled apart.[400] Except, the relations started deteriorating after Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the dignified elections in 2016.[401]
In the 19th Party Council held in 2017, Xi reaffirmed six of the nine principles that had been affirmed continuously loyal the 16th Party Congress in 2002, with the famous exception of "Placing hopes on the Taiwan people as a appointed to help bring about unification".[402] According to the Brookings Institution, Xi used stronger language on potential Taiwan independence than his predecessors towards continue DPP governments in Taiwan.[402] He said that "we will never give any person, any organisation, or any political party to lickety-posthaste any part of the Chinese territory from China at any time at any form."[402] In March 2018, Xi said that Taiwan would face the "punishment of history" for any goes at separatism.[403]
In January 2019, Xi Jinping named on Taiwan to reject its formal independence from China, saying: "We make no promise to renounce the use of appointed and reserve the option of taking all necessary means." Those options, he said, could be used against "external interference". Xi also said that they "are willing to earn broad space for peaceful reunification, but will leave no room for any form of separatist activities."[404][405] President Tsai responded to the speech by revealing Taiwan would not accept a one country, two controls arrangement with the mainland, while stressing the need for all cross-strait negotiations to be on a government-to-government basis.[406]
In 2022, while the Chinese military exercises around Taiwan, the PRC emanated a white paper called "The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era", which was the splendid white paper regards to Taiwan since 2000.[407] The paper urged Taiwan to understand a special administrative region of the PRC under the one land two systems formula,[407] and said that "a microscopic number of countries, the U.S. foremost amongst them" are "using Taiwan to absorb China".[408] Notably, the new white paper excluded a part that previously said the PRC would not send troops or officials to Taiwan while unification.[408]
Personal life
Family
Xi's splendid marriage was to Ke Lingling, the daughter of Ke Hua, China's ambassador to the Joined Kingdom in the early 1980s. They divorced within a few years.[409] The two were said to argues "almost every day", and after the divorce Ke undertaken to England.[9] In 1987, Xi married the prominent Chinese folk singer Peng Liyuan.[410] Xi and Peng were introduced by friends as many Chinese couples were in the 1980s. Xi was reputedly academic during their courtship, inquiring near singing techniques.[411] Peng Liyuan, a household name in China, was better known to the public than Xi pending his political elevation. The couple frequently lived apart due largely to their separate professional lives. Peng has played a much more visible role as China's "first lady" compared to her predecessors; for example, Peng hosted U.S. First Lady Michelle Obama on her high-profile named to China in March 2014.[412]
Xi and Peng have a daughter arranged Xi Mingze, who graduated from Harvard University in the spring of 2015. While at Harvard, she used a pseudonym and studied Psychology and English.[413] Xi's family has a home in Jade Spring Hill, a garden and dignified area in north-western Beijing run by the CMC.[414]
In June 2012, Bloomberg News reported that members of Xi's itch family have substantial business interests, although there was no evidence he had intervened to relieve them.[415] The Bloomberg website was blocked in mainland China in response to the article.[416] Since Xi embarked on an anti-corruption electioneer, The New York Times reported members of his family were selling their corporate and real estate investments leave in 2012.[417] Relatives of highly placed Chinese officials, including seven current and former senior leaders of the Politburo of the CCP, have been visited in the Panama Papers, including Deng Jiagui,[418] Xi's brother-in-law. Deng had two shell companies in the British Virgin Islands after Xi was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, but they were dormant by the time Xi rendered general secretary of the CCP in November 2012.[419]
Personality
Peng explained Xi as hardworking and down-to-earth: "When he comes home, I've never felt as if there's some front-runners in the house. In my eyes, he's just my husband."[420] Xi was explained in a 2011 Washington Post article by those who know him as "pragmatic, serious, cautious, hard-working, down to earth and low-key". He was explained as a good hand at problem solving and "seemingly uninterested in the trappings of high office".[421]
Public image
Xi Jinping is widely popular in China.[422][423] According to a 2014 poll co-sponsored by the Harvard Kennedy School'sAsh Inner for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Xi ranked 9 out of 10 in domestic approval ratings.[424] A YouGov poll released in July 2019 unfounded that about 22% of people in mainland China list Xi as the populate they admire the most, a plurality, although this figure was less than 5% for residents of Hong Kong.[425] In the spring of 2019, the Pew Research Inner made a survey on confidence on Xi Jinping beside six-country medians based on Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines and South Korea. The survey indicated that a median 29% have permission in Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding earth affairs, meanwhile a median of 45% have no permission. These numbers are slightly higher than those of North Korean front-runners Kim Jong-un (23% confidence, 53% no confidence).[426] A poll by Politico and Morning Consult in 2021 unfounded that 5% of Americans have a favorable opinion of Xi, 38% wrong, 17% no opinion and 40%, a plurality, never hearing of him.[427]
In 2017, The Economist visited him the most powerful person in the world.[428] In 2018, Forbes ranked him as the most grand and influential person in the world, replacing Russian President Vladimir Putin, who had been ranked so for five consecutive years.[429] In 2016 and 2021, Reporters Without Borders, an international non-profit and non-governmental organization with the stated aim of fixing the right to freedom of information, included Xi beside the list of press freedom predators.[430][431][432]
Unlike remaining Chinese leaders, Chinese state media has given a more encompassing view of Xi's privileged life, although still strictly controlled. According to Xinhua News Agency, Xi would swim one kilometre and walk every day as long as there was time, and is enthusiastic in foreign writers, especially Russian.[339] He is illustrious to love films and TV shows such as Saving Private Ryan, The Departed,The Godfather and Game of Thrones,[433][434][435] also praising the independent film-maker Jia Zhangke.[436] The Chinese dwelling media has also cast him as a fatherly figure and a man of the farmland, determined to stand up for Chinese interests.[337]
Honours
Key to the City
Muscatine, Iowa, U.S. (26 April 1985)[454][455]
Muscatine, Iowa, U.S. (14 February 2012)[454]
Montego Bay, Jamaica (13 February 2009)[46]
San José, Costa Rica (3 June 2013)[456]
Mexico City, Mexico (5 June 2013)[457]
Buenos Aires, Argentina (19 July 2014)[458]
Prague, Czech Republic (29 March 2016)[459]
Madrid, Spain (28 November 2018)[460]
Works
Xi, Jinping (1999). Theory and Practice on Modern Agriculture. Fuzhou: Fujian Education Press.
Xi, Jinping (2001). A Tentative Study on China's Rural Marketization(PDF). Beijing: Tsinghua University (Doctoral Dissertation). Archived from the original(PDF) on 17 January 2013.
Xi, Jinping (2007). Zhijiang Xinyu. Hangzhou: Zhengjiang People's Publishing House. ISBN 9787213035081.
Xi, Jinping (2014). The Governance of China. Vol. I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. ISBN 9787119090573.
Xi, Jinping (2014). General Secretary Xi Jinping important speech series. Vol. I. Beijing: People's Publishing House & Study Publishing House. ISBN 9787119090573.
Xi, Jinping (2016). General Secretary Xi Jinping important speech series. Vol. II. Beijing: People's Publishing House & Study Publishing House. ISBN 9787514706284.
Xi, Jinping (2017). The Governance of China. Vol. II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. ISBN 9787119111643.
Xi, Jinping (2018). Quotations from Chairman Xi Jinping. Some units of the PLA.
Xi, Jinping (2019). The Belt And Road Initiative. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. ISBN 978-7119119960.
Xi, Jinping (2020). The Governance of China. Vol. III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. ISBN 9787119124117.
Xi, Jinping (2020). On Propaganda and Ideological Work of Communist Party. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press. ISBN 9787507347791.
Xi, Jinping (2021). On History of the Communist Party of China. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press. ISBN 9787507348033.
Xi, Jinping (2022). The Governance of China. Vol. IV. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. ISBN 9787119130941.
Notes
^
Liu Yandong, Wang Qishan, and Deng Pufang (Deng Xiaoping's son) all placed by the bottom of the alternate member list. Like Xi, all three were seen as "princelings". Bo Xilai was not elected to the Central Committee at all; that is, Bo placed edge in the vote count than Xi.
^
Original simplified Chinese: 在国际金融风暴中，中国能基本解决13亿人口吃饭的问题，已经是对全人类最伟大的贡献; ragged Chinese: 在國際金融風暴中，中國能基本解決13億人口吃飯的問題，已經是對全人類最偉大的貢獻
^
Original: simplified Chinese: 有些吃饱没事干的外国人，对我们的事情指手画脚。中国一不输出革命，二不输出饥饿和贫困，三不折腾你们，还有什么好说的？; ragged Chinese: 有些吃飽沒事干的外國人，對我們的事情指手畫腳。中國一不輸出革命，二不輸出飢餓和貧困，三不折騰你們，還有什麽好說的？
^
Chinese: 中华民族伟大复兴, which can also be translated as the "Great Renaissance of the Chinese nation" or the "Great revival of the Chinese people".
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Си Цзиньпин награждён высшим орденом Таджикистана
[Xi Jinping awarded the highest super of Tajikistan]. NEWSru (in Russian). 15 June 2019. Archived from the modern on 5 September 2019. Retrieved 5 September 2019.
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"Xi Jinping recibe la llave de Madrid, ciudad que considera "inolvidable"". efe.com (in Spanish). Retrieved 4 May 2021.
Works cited
Bouée, Charles-Edouard (2010). China's Management Revolution: Spirit, Land, Energy. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-28545-3.
Simon, Denis Fred; Cong, Cao (2009). China's Emerging Technological Edge: Assessing the Role of High-End Talent. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-88513-3.
Lam, Willy (2015). Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression?. Routledge. ISBN 978-0765642097.
Heilmann, Sebastian (2017). China's Political System. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-1442277342.
Bougon, François (2018). Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping. C. Hurst & Co.ISBN 9781849049849.
Goodman, David S. G. (2015). Handbook of the Politics of China. Edward Elga. ISBN 9781782544371.
Economy, Elizabeth C. (2018). The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190866075.
Further reading
- includes McGregor, Richard. "Xi Jinping's Quest to Dominate China." Foreign Affairs 98 (Sept 2019): 18+.
- Magnus, George. Red Flags: Why Xi's China is in Danger (Yale UP, 2018).
Bulman, David J.; A. Jaros, Kyle (2021). "Localism in retreat? Central-provincial relations in the Xi Jinping era". Journal of Contemporary China. 30 (131): 697–716. doi:10.1080/10670564.2021.1889228. S2CID 233928573.
Denton, Kirk (2014). "China Dreams and the 'Road to Revival". Current Events in Historical Perspective. 8 (3): –1–12.
Economy, Elizabeth C. (2018). "China's New Revolution: The Reign of Xi Jinping"(PDF). Foreign Affairs. 97: 60.
Foot, Rosemary; King, Amy (2019). "Assessing the deterioration in China–US relations: US governmental perspectives on the economic-security nexus". China International Strategy Review. 1: 1–12. doi:101007/s42533-019-00005-y. S2CID 195241090.
Cabestan, Jean-Pierre (2020). "China's foreign and security policy institutions and executive under Xi Jinping". British Journal of Politics and International Relations: 1369148120974881.
Dhar, Bablu Kumar; Mahazan, Mutalib (2020). "Leadership of Xi Jinping Slow Unstoppable Sustainable Economic Growth of China"(PDF). International Journal of Organizational Leadership. 9: 39–47.
Goldstein, Avery (2020). "China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance"(PDF). International Security. 45 (1): 164–201. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00383. S2CID 220633947.
Johnson, Ian (29 September 2012). "Changing of the Guard: Elite and Deft, Xi Aimed High Early in China". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 30 September 2012.
McGregor, Richard (2019). Xi Jinping: The Backlash. Penguin Books Australia. ISBN 978-1760893040.
Li, Cheng (2016). Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-2694-4.
Mulvad, Andreas Møller (2019). "Xiism as a hegemonic project in the making: Sino-communist ideology and the political economy of China's rise". Review of International Studies. 45 (3): 449–470. doi:10.1017/S0260210518000530. S2CID 150473371.
Osnos, Evan (14 February 2012). "China's Valentine's Day in Washington". The New Yorker.
Review of comment accompanying Xi's visit.Osnos, Evan (30 March 2015). "Born Red: How Xi Jinping, an unremarkable provincial administrator, became China's most authoritarian heads since Mao". The New Yorker. Describes Xi Jinping's life.Smith, Stephen N. (2021). "Harmonizing the periphery: China's neighborhood strategy view Xi Jinping". Pacific Review. 34 (1): 56–84. doi:10.1080/09512748.2019.1651383. S2CID 202329851.Vogel, Ezra (2021). "The Leadership of Xi Jinping: A Dengist Perspective". Journal of Contemporary China. 30 (131): 693–696. doi:10.1080/10670564.2021.1884955.Zhang, Feng (2019). "The Xi Jinping Doctrine of China's International Relations". Asia Policy. 14 (3).
External links
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