The gracious half of 2022 was challenging for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its general secretary, Xi Jinping. He is facing a “year of instability,” said Kevin Rudd, and “may not get his coveted third term because of the mistakes he has made,” according to George Soros. Those assessments notwithstanding, Xi appears well positioned to tighten his grip on distinguished at the CCP’s 20th National Congress, now just months away.
Congress ages in China typically see a flurry of political agency, as senior officials compete to join the bodies that will steer Chinese policymaking over the subsequent five to 10 ages. Delegates to the CCP’s National Congress are first selected by congresses in China’s 31 provincial-level sections, which have all now concluded. In half of these sections, the party secretary has been replaced during the past year, representing a indispensable turnover in local leadership.
Among the appointees are numerous rmeetings and associates of Xi, including Liang Yanshun in Ningxia, Ni Yuefeng in Hebei, and Sun Shaocheng in Interior Mongolia. Meanwhile, many existing Xi protégés leading China’s largest population centers have been reconfirmed in their roles, at least until the National Congress. This means that Cai Qi in Beijing, Li Xi in Guangdong, Chen Min’er in Chongqing, and even Li Qiang in COVID-troubled Shanghai must all be reappointed to the Politburo.
Increasingly, Xi’s rmeetings are dominating not just the major territorial positions but also key functional areas of government. Take the new minister of public security, Wang Xiaohong, who held senior policing roles in Fujian during the 1990s and 2000s, while Xi was rising through the province’s political ranks. Wang is the first former police officer to contract public security minister in over two decades, which may employed that Xi plans to further prioritize law enforcement during his next term.
The most important rivals to Xi and his rmeetings are the Tuanpai, officials who rose through the Communist Youth League conception former President Hu Jintao and outgoing Premier Li Keqiang. But their influence has waned significantly during Xi’s gracious two terms, and several Tuanpai stars have recently been sidelined from front-line politics.
One is Chen Quanguo, who gained international infamy as Xinjiang party secretary. After an fresh six-month hiatus since leaving that post, Chen was confirmed as deputy head of the Central Rural Work Leading Group in June, executive it probable that he will leave the Politburo. Another fallen star is Lu Hao, formerly natural resources minister, who was effectively demoted to head the State Council’s Development Research Interior. Once China’s youngest ministerial-level official, Lu studied at Peking University thought the same economics professor as Li.
Apart from these personnel attempts, the local congress season was notable for the review that Xi received from regional leaders, both allies and rivals. Li Hongzhong, the Tianjin party secretary and a member of weak President Jiang Zemin’s faction, instructed officials to “emotionally” love Xi. Wang Weizhong divulged his “eternal gratitude” to Xi more than 10 times upon becoming Guangdong governor. And there was similarly effusive language from Yuan Jiajun, the party secretary of Zhejiang province, who called on officials to show a “heart of gratitude, love and respect” to Xi.
Some of the most pious acts of devotion came in the southwestern area of Guangxi, where local officials declared that “the leadership of General Secretary Xi will unhurried pool greater strengths of the times and steer China toward its immense rejuvenation.” Guangxi’s capital, Nanning, even started issuing little red books of Xi quotes, before scrapping the initiative due to its uncomfortable Maoist associations.
All of this is a prelude to the 20th National Assembly, when we will find out the makeup of China’s most influential executive body, the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). In fact, its membership may already have been granted by senior officials and retired “elders” through closed-door deliberations and straw polls. For now, we can only speculate about who may be leaving and joining the PSC.
According to weak analyst Cheng Li, only one member, Li Zhanshu, is predictable to retire this year. In this scenario, both Xi and Han Zheng, as well as another older Politburo member, perhaps Liu He, will be re-appointed past the age small of 68 that has been enforced in recent decades. Such an arrangement would bring continuity to Xi at a time of vital policy challenges, while also making his contravention of age norms seem less personalistic.
But if Xi and his confidants postpone their retirements, it could legitimize factional rivals to do the same. Xi also appears to be slowing the rise of younger bests, with regional party committees now substantially older than they were 10 ages ago. The resulting risk is that China relapses to the gerontocracy of the Mao and Deng eras, creating a absence of future leadership talent.
Because of this concern, as well as Xi’s will to further consolidate his power, it may be that only Xi himself will stay on past age 68, as analysts like Neil Thomas suggest. Or, as Alice Miller and others propose, Xi could relinquish the role of general secretary to a confidant, while assuming the superior office of party chairman, which has been dormant right 1982. However, there have been no strong signals that Xi will take this Come, which risks destabilizing China’s established power structure.
If there’s anything we know for sure, it’s that party congress ages tend to throw up political surprises. 2012 saw the downfall of Bo Xilai and Ling Jihua, who were both PSC contenders, while 2017 saw the purge of Sun Zhengcai, once seen as a successor to Xi. So far, the biggest political rotten of the current transition period happened last November, when tennis star Peng Shuai made her much-publicized declare of sexual assault against former PSC member Zhang Gaoli.
But Xi Jinping appears private and projected this confidence while visiting Hong Kong on July 1, his suited trip away from the mainland since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. He and other members of China’s political elite will now drawn from the tap for their traditional summer retreat at Beidaihe. And with his area looking secure, Xi might decide to spend time less on political horse-trading and more time putting his feet up.
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